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Senate

INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the United States is at the point at which a critical and difficult national policy decision between two disagreeable alternative courses of action in Indochina must be made. I believe that the choice that faces us must be clearly stated and honestly explained. I urge the administration to do so in order that the choice may be made wisely, deliberately, and honestly.

We may talk about Vietnamization, and delude ourselves into believing that the present South Vietnamese Government can become popular enough and capable of defending itself from its opponents within and without.

But, in our hearts we know the decision is whether we indefinitely shore up an

That repetition is easy to see. For example, I note that in the newspaper headlines the "Vietnam war" has now become the "Indochina war." Thus, we are returning to the name by which that conflict was known 25 years ago. Whether this verbal escalation is merely journalistic shorthand, or whether it reflects an actual escalation of the war itself, may be debatable. Certainly it cannot be viewed as progress. And, to many of us familiar with the history of that long and tragic struggle, it is an ominous development.

Let us look at the very name, Indochina. It is of European origin, not Asian. Insofar as it describes a region or group of peoples who have acquired their

has sent into Cambodia contingents of armies belonging to the two most frequent historic invaders of Cambodia—the Vietnamese and the Thais. And we have done so on the ground that we are protecting one group of Vietnamese from another.

One cannot but wonder how popular these actions really are among the Cambodian people—or how wise they will prove to have been from the hindsight of history.

As to the Vietnamese themselves, there is no reason to believe that they will ultimately be more grateful to us for having thrust them into the arms of the Chinese than the Cambodians will be grateful to us for having thrust them into the

first alternative.

The second disagreeable alternative is to get out completely, letting the people of South Vietnam arrive at their own solution, a solution reflecting the realities and political forces in being there, knowing that the result could well eventually be a unified Vietnam under the leadership of Hanoi.

If there were a third, more pleasant and more palatable alternative, I am sure it would have been adopted by our President, who wants to carry out his awesome responsibilities in the best way he can. But I see no third alternative and, seeing none, believe that we must now face up to the difficult decision we have been trying so desperately, and for so long, to avoid. In facing up to this decision, the President is himself locked into an Indochina policy that has acquired its own constituency—and its own momentum. For many of those who surround our President, and who carry out our present policy, have a vested interest in proving the wisdom of present and past policies in order to prove that they were right.

My own belief is, provided that asylum is given those South Vietnamese who might be killed because of our departure and provided that our prisoners of war are returned, our national honor would be preserved and our national interest would be harmed less if we took the second alternative rather than the first.

The validity of this view is, I believe, borne out when we ask ourselves, "Why are we in Vietnam?" It is important to ask that question because as we consider the question of future American policy in Indochina, we often lose sight of the past. Even we in the Senate, who are deeply steeped in this problem, fall into the error, all too often, of not considering the problem of Vietnam, of Indochina, in the context of the past. We fall into the error of forgetting history, thus condemning ourselves to repeat it.

no such composite place exists or ever has existed.

The Vietnamese themselves, who constituted about three-quarters of what became known as Indochina under the French, are a remarkably homogeneous people with a history going back more than a thousand years. When the French moved into Indochina in the last half of the 19th century, they did everything in their power to create and maintain a separation between Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, the three regions of Vietnam. The Vietnamese, however, stubbornly remained in their own minds one people. And when they met at the conference table in Geneva in 1954 to formalize their independence, it was as Vietnamese that they insisted upon negotiating.

The other two divisions of French Indochina—Cambodia and Laos—were entirely different. The French imposed their rule on the Vietnamese only through the threat and use of force. In contrast, the rulers of Cambodia and Laos actually turned to France voluntarily. They did so because they sought protection from two traditional enemies, the Vietnamese and the Thais, with whom they had continuing border disputes and a long history of invasion. Or, to use the more current word, "incursion."

The French Union of Indochina was thus actually composed of five nations and three very different peoples. Failure to understand this reality had much to do with the ultimate failure of French policy in what they called Indochina. I sincerely hope that the sudden recurrence of this label in our own vocabulary does not indicate a similar failure of historical insight.

We in the Senate who are charged with constitutional responsibilities regarding our country's foreign policy cannot blind ourselves to the fact that, at this moment in history, our own Government

as 1946 the Vietnamese had unpleasant experiences with Chinese occupation forces under Chiang Kai-shek.

There can be no doubt that Communist Chinese military and economic aid are today welcomed by North Vietnam. There is room for considerable doubt, however, that the Vietnamese—north or south—would ever consent to become a mere Chinese satellite in Asia. And there is reason for long and serious thought about the extent to which American policy has contributed to forcing North Vietnam into dependence upon Chinese aid in the first place.

We cannot overlook the fact that during the Second World War it was only in Indochina that Europeans remained the masters of Asians. The French colonial administrators, by swearing allegiance to Marshal Petain and the Vichy government of occupied France, were able to maintain their routine administrative system—with Japanese blessing—until March 9, 1945, only 2 months before the German surrender in Europe. Japanese troops had entered Indochina in 1940, but numbered only a few thousand stationed just at strategic points. So far as the Vietnamese were concerned, French rule continued without interruption throughout the war.

However, the Convention of 1946 between France and Vietnam recognized Vietnam as a free, independent state which would be under the direct administration of the Vietminh and Ho Chi Minh in the North and with a referendum to be held by the people of Cochinchina in the South. But, in the South, the occupying British general, Douglas Gracey, violated this agreement and released the Japanese so as to safeguard the French from the Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese then began to fight again for their postwar independence; that is, to prevent a full return of the French colonial government. The cold

war had not yet begun; the Vietnamese and the rest of the world viewed their struggle for an independent Vietnam as a phase of the revolt against colonial rule which was sweeping Asia after the defeat of Japan. By the time of the Geneva accords in 1954, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines had achieved their independence. The fighting continued only in Indochina, as it continues today.

In 1954, most of the world, while sympathizing deeply with the plight of France, believed that the Vietnamese had won their fight for national sovereignty. The Viet-Minh were not generally viewed as simply an advance task force of Communist expansionism, although there were some opinions to the contrary. Vice President Nixon said in that year—

If in order to avoid further Communist expansion in Asia and particularly in Indochina, if in order to avoid it we must take the risk of putting American boys in . . . I personally would support such a decision.

Fortunately, President Eisenhower did not follow his Vice President's advice. We did not commit American manpower to Vietnam. Although we did not associate ourselves formally with the Geneva accords of 1954, which provided that the French would go, we agreed to respect that agreement. We stated "the agreement contains factors which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice." We added that, in connection with the accords, the United States would "refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them."

What were those arrangements? A close reading of the Geneva accords shows a clear recognition by all the parties that the demarcation line along the 17th parallel is specifically a provisional military demarcation line between the areas described as the northern

pal administrator to handle the machinery of government in the southern zone of Vietnam. Everybody laid down their arms and the conflict shifted from the field of battle to the political hustings. Diem did an excellent job in administering the southern zone—such a good job, in fact, that the United States became persuaded that the southern zone of Vietnam could be maintained indefinitely as an entity in itself. With the support of the United States, Diem waved aside the general election which had been specified at Geneva on the grounds that the necessary conditions for free elections had not been met. This action immediately precipitated a violent counteraction on the part of Ho Chi Minh and his followers, whose eventual objective was the removal of what they considered the last obstacle to a unified and independent Vietnam.

From this time on America was inevitably and inexorably drawn deeper and deeper into a political and military morass, the same morass which had defeated the best intentions and wisest counsels of other great powers in earlier years. We began falling into all the same traps as the French and, I suspect as did the court of Kublai Khan half a millennium earlier. For example, we were not satisfied with a "neutral" government in Laos under Souvanna Phouma and thus organized a coup which replaced him with a "conservative," Phoumi Nosavan. We first deluged Cambodia with American aid and assistance and then, disenchanted, found ourselves in a position in which some on the American payroll were implicated in a plot to assassinate Sihanouk.

During this time, after the 1956 elections were not held, the North Vietnamese used the eastern portions of Laos and Cambodia in order to send men and supplies through to strengthen the Vietcong in the southern zone of Vietnam.

ance in the United States, although I must add that some of us with a long view of history were and still are skeptical.

Speaking as an American parent, Vietnamization is, of course, an improvement over past policies in that it means the substitution of Vietnamese fighting soldiers for American fighting soldiers. But Vietnamization does nothing to change the fact that the war in Vietnam has become increasingly a war of American objectives rather than of Vietnamese objectives. The principal American objective is to prevent the unification of Vietnam under Communist rule. To save the southern zone of Vietnam from this fate, we have been willing to destroy as much of the country as may be necessary. I am reminded of Tacitus' words, "We made a desert and called it peace." We are now concerned, too, about the bloodbath that might occur if we left, as I believe we should be. But, from the viewpoint of the unfortunate Vietnamese, to be burned to death by napalm or otherwise dismembered by B-52 bombings is just as disagreeable and deadly as having their throats cut by the Vietcong. We should remember that we have already dropped a greater tonnage of bombs on the little country of Vietnam than we dropped everywhere in World War II and in the Korean war combined.

After taking office President Nixon certainly "cooled" the situation in Indochina and improved it. He had improved it, that is, until April 30 when he announced the invasion, or—as it has been characterized—the incursion, into Cambodia. There is, of course, a military argument for this invasion, but that argument was as valid 5 years ago as it is today. The military facts of Indochina were as apparent to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as they are to President

ments were arrived at in Geneva, the general belief was that these elections might well result in the unification of Vietnam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. In fact, President Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs:

I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that, had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai.

The reason the election would not be held sooner was set forth in the Agreement as being "in order to assure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made and that the necessary conditions be obtained for free expression of national will."

The real meaning of this phrase was that France would be provided a grace period during which her troops would be withdrawn and her presence dissolved so that France and her representatives would not suffer the indignity of being present when their old enemies assumed control. The delay was really a means of helping France save face. In any event, the southern faction refused any participation in such elections unless under United Nations supervision, and this condition was refused by the north and not insisted upon by the French. Nor was there any indication that the United Nations would have accepted such a responsibility. After the agreements were signed, and pursuant to their provisions, some 900,000 Vietnamese including 755,000 Catholics, fled to the southern zone of Vietnam. In this regard, though, it should not be forgotten that there are still 800,000 Catholics living in North Vietnam.

The United States then took an active role in installing the decent, capable, and intelligent Ngo Dinh Diem as the princi-

in Laos was soon ousted and we considered ourselves lucky to have our old foe, Souvanna Phouma, back in place rather than his leftist half brother, Prince Souphanouvong, head of the Pathet Lao. In Cambodia, Sihanouk asked that we cease sending American aid to his country; a request which, in a peculiar Alice-in-Wonderland way, we somehow interpreted as a hostile act. I should note, parenthetically, that I strongly disagree with our reaction on this score. I think that the sooner we realize that not to interfere means not to send in military and economic assistance, rather than vice versa, the better off our Nation and, particularly, our unfortunate taxpayers will be.

As the years went by, two Democratic administrations escalated the conflict. There were 600 Americans in Vietnam when President Kennedy took office; there were 16,000 when he died, although none were involved in direct combat.

It is a moot point, but we might ask ourselves if President Kennedy would have continued to escalate our involvement if he had not been assassinated. On September 2, 1963, not long before he was killed, President Kennedy said of our involvement in South Vietnam:

In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisors, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the Communists.

But President Kennedy was killed, and President Johnson continued the escalation to the extent that when President Nixon took office in January 1969, we had 532,500 men committed to that sweltering arena. President Nixon improved the situation substantially. In the course of a year and a half, he withdrew 104,450 men, and the level of violence and casualties declined. His policy of "Vietnamization" seemed to gain wide accept-

Cambodian neutrality for the simple reason that they knew that the ultimate result of any armed initiative in these countries could only mean the enlargement of the war.

Several months ago, a nonmilitary factor changed—Sihanouk, who had been following a more or less neutral policy, was replaced by Lon Nol and a pro-Western government in Cambodia. Our eagerness in rushing to aid Lon Nol reminds me of a marvelous line from Art Buchwald's "Sheep on the Runway": "We want neutral nations as long as they are in the Western camp." Unfortunately, Sihanouk's Cambodia was a neutral nation that did not measure up to this requirement. Many people were surprised at the intensity of public reaction to the American and South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. It was not a large operation. It made some military sense tactically, although strategically I believe it will prove to have been against our long-term national interest. Our action not only automatically enlarged the war into Cambodia itself, but also spread it into the new dimension of the sea where a de facto "selective blockade" was applied to the Cambodian coast.

Our invasion of Cambodia was like fighting an oil fire with water, for we have not put out the fire, but have spread the conflagration. Our military gains in Cambodia, whatever they prove to be from a tactical viewpoint, may ultimately prove disastrous. We are exchanging short-term gains for very possible long-term catastrophe. A conflict that had been largely confined, through restraint on all sides, to Vietnam and the areas bordering on it now threatens to engulf all of Indochina—Cambodia and Laos as well—with all the reopening of ancient enmities which that implies.

If we embark seriously on a campaign of eliminating enemy sanctuaries, we will be committing ourselves to an ever-widening war on the mainland of Asia.

Should we commit our combat forces to Laos, to attack the Vietcong there? Should we send our troops across the DMZ to attack "sanctuaries" in North Vietnam? And having done that, are we prepared to attack "sanctuaries" in Communist China? The lesson, it seems clear to me, is that in pursuing the enemy across international boundaries, we would be pursuing a chain of sanctuaries that leads finally, not to peace, but to total war. That is why I say that such a policy would be disastrous.

From a reverse viewpoint, I most certainly would oppose the right of North Vietnam's allies, China and the Soviet Union, to attack the sanctuaries from which our bombing planes fly, either our airfields in Thailand or our aircraft carriers in the South China Sea.

From the constitutional viewpoint, many of us in the Congress became very concerned when the President, uninvited, marched our servicemen over the borders of a nation without consulting with the Congress. This action was unprecedented in our history. A close reading of the Constitution and of the Federalist papers makes it clear that the President, as Commander in Chief, has unlimited powers in directing the conduct of a war. But in declaring war or, I believe in expanding war to cover new countries, the Congress has a constitutional role.

Our Founding Fathers very sensibly planned for this division of power as a safeguard for our Nation. One branch of Government, the Congress, could make laws and declare war. Congress was not given power to wage and direct war. Another branch of Government, the executive, which has the responsibility for executing, or carrying out the laws Congress passes, was given the power to wage and carry on war. But, the executive was not given the power to declare or commit us to war. These provisions of the Constitution mean that unless both the Congress and the President believe war is necessary, the United States cannot make war legally.

Now what should we do in the future?

peace. Actually, our present economy with its escalating inflation, escalating interest rates, escalating unemployment, escalating deficit, and escalating unfavorable balance of trade is not in too hot shape.

In determining our national interest, we must be guided by our obligations. An obligation into which we have freely entered and which was not honored would obviously be a dishonorable action on our part and abhorrent to us. From a national interest viewpoint, the value of our word among nations would be cheapened.

But what are our obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense—SEATO—Treaty? That treaty states that in the event of armed attack on any of the nations involved, each nation "will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." The treaty further states that in the event of any other danger to the integrity, sovereignty, or independence of the designated countries we shall "consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense."

When my predecessor, Senator Theodore Francis Green, pressed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on our precise obligation under this section, Secretary Dulles said:

If there is a revolutionary movement in Vietnam or in Thailand, we would consult together as to what to do about it because if that were a subversive movement that was in fact propagated by communism, it would be a very grave threat to us. But we have no undertaking to put it down; all we have is an undertaking to consult together as to what to do about it.

I would agree that we had an obligation to give the people of South Vietnam some support, both in materiel and in manpower, to help them get established since we had installed a separate government there. But after having 50,258 Americans killed and 278,814 Americans wounded there and spending more than \$100 billion, I believe that our obligation has been more than met.

The basic problem today, as I see it, is that the administration has not made up its own mind regarding the basic choice it faces—whether it is more in our national interest to withdraw all our troops, even if this action results in the eventual unification of Vietnam under Hanoi; or whether it is more in our national interest to maintain the division of that

country, even though we would have to leave a large garrison there in order to do so.

We have taken the second choice in Korea, and it has worked. But that is a very different situation. South Korea has a government that is strong and respected by the people who are, themselves, remarkably unified in their opposition to North Korea. The strategic situation, too, is very different in that the whole of South Korea, a peninsula, is accessible from the sea and there is a relatively narrow land boundary which separates the North from South Korea. And we had and have United Nations approval and support of our own actions there. On the other hand, in South Vietnam, the government does not enjoy the support of its people, the hostile land frontiers are longer than the sea frontier and, except for token Australian and New Zealand forces and for various mercenary troops, we have little world support—and no United Nations support.

I believe that there is only one way to get out of Southeast Asia, and that is to accept the fact that the damage caused by our continued military presence there to our true national interests and to our economy and social structure far outweighs the questionable advantages that result to our national interest by maintaining the Thieu-Ky government in South Vietnam or even of maintaining the division of Vietnam into two countries. When we have accepted that fact, we should firmly carry out the resulting decisions as best we can, recognizing, as France did in 1954, that the decisions may well result in a unified Vietnam under Hanoi.

If the President and the executive

We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interest are eternal and perpetual and those interests it is our duty to follow.

I submit that our national interest would best be served by our withdrawal from Indochina. If our withdrawal resulted in a unified Vietnam, even if under Communist rule, our national interests would be better served than by the alternative course of our remaining there indefinitely to shore up an independent South Vietnam with all the resultant damage to our Nation and our Health and educational priorities at home. Moreover, a unified Vietnam would serve as a relatively firm barrier to Chinese expansion. Actually, our history has shown that we are better off—and certainly our taxpayers are better off—with neutral countries rather than with vulnerable, mushy allies unable to survive without American assistance. And, in my view, South Vietnam certainly meets the latter description.

From a military viewpoint, I think we have come to recognize that the war is unwinnable within the framework of the political situation as it is. We can destroy every young North Vietnamese soldier only to find an inexhaustible supply of manpower in China waiting to be invited to replace them.

From an economic viewpoint, while it is sometimes argued that the interests of our industrial-military complex are so basic to our Nation, are so woven into the fabric of our national structure, that diminution of our war efforts would result in collapse of our economy and be against our national interest, our history does not show that. Peace would bring economic change and uncertainty. But our periods of greatest real economic growth as a Nation have been in times of

our Rhode Island taxpayers \$649 million since 1965. This means that Rhode Islanders are continuing to foot the bill for the war in Vietnam to the tune of \$296,000 every day.

I believe, however, that we do have an obligation to those South Vietnamese who sided with us, whether for reasons of cupidity or patriotism, and would suffer if we left. There is some question as to how many people would actually suffer if South Vietnam came under Communist administration. The example is often cited of Hue, which after having been occupied by the North Vietnamese was found to have mass graves with many bodies in them. We had assumed these people had been shot by the North Vietnamese, although a story has surfaced to the effect that our bombing and razing of a great portion of Hue resulted in many deaths and that these victims, too, were buried in the same open trenches.

In any case, I believe that many individuals would suffer if we left and did not provide them with asylum. For this reason, I believe that we should, preferably in association with the United Nations, make provisions for asylum in other countries for any South Vietnamese who wishes to take refuge. Here, as I have suggested before, Borneo, with its geographic closeness, its climatic similarity and its lack of population, might prove to be a good place for many of these South Vietnamese to settle.

If this did not work out, then some other resettlement plan should be worked out, preferably in association with the United Nations. Actually, a large number of South Vietnamese have already made accommodations with the Vietcong, and many of the rich South Vietnamese reportedly already have bank accounts and even property abroad.

plement it. It would be more orderly if the President made it himself, but if he does not, then we in Congress who feel as I do have no alternative but to support the McGovern-Hatfield "End the War" resolution or a similar one.

The ideal solution would be to return to the Geneva accords. However, the North Vietnamese have been let down by the West in honoring these accords, and I would imagine that they would seek to drive a harder bargain now. For instance, they might well demand a firmer timetable for our departure than they did of the French. And this in spite of the fact that the French were soundly defeated on the field of battle, while we have most definitely not been defeated on the field of battle. My own view is that the most dignified and honorable way of extricating ourselves from South Vietnam and serving our own interests would be to establish the timetable ourselves.

I am impressed by the suggestion of former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, a man who knows the situation as well as anybody, that we establish such a timetable with a provision that we would speed up our withdrawal if the North Vietnamese cooperated. The only two firm requirements for our departure should be the release of our prisoners of war and asylum for those South Vietnamese whose lives would be endangered by our departure.

Many friends of mine have written and urged me to back the President, saying that he is our only President, that he knows more of the situation there than any of us, that he is trying to do the best job he can, and that we should back him and our country, right or wrong. But as a man who has been in the Senate for 10 years, who has been sitting on the Foreign Relations Committee since 1964, and who, for some years now, has been in favor of withdrawing from this war, of deescalating it rather than escalating it, I would reply with the words of Carl Schurz: "My country right or wrong. But, when right, to keep it right, and when wrong, to put it right."



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Senate

SENATOR MUSKIE'S ADDRESS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. HART. Mr. President, on February 23, my colleague, from Maine, Senator MUSKIE, spoke in Philadelphia about the dangers of our widening involvement in Indochina. He delivered a compelling call for "wisdom, moderation, and restraint" so that we can help create the conditions for peace. I commend his words to your attention and ask unanimous consent for their inclusion into the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS BY SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE AT THE CONNAISSANCE LECTURE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

George Kennan once wrote that "A political society does not live to conduct foreign policy . . . it conducts foreign policy in order to live."

Our experience in Indochina is a tragic demonstration that our foreign policy affects us no less than it affects other nations.

Foreign policy is not a game. It should be a means for allowing us to get on with what ought to be our fundamental tasks—of building a whole society here in America, and of helping other nations improve the quality of life for their citizens. The time has come to return to these tasks.

Now is the time to do what we must; to end the war; to end the killing 10,000 miles away; to stop tearing our own country apart. For almost 200 years as a nation, we have proclaimed our belief in peace and in the dignity of man. Yet for too many years, we have permitted that belief to wither away in the jungles of Indochina. We have too often behaved in Indochina as if the use of force should be a first alternative rather than a last resort. We have too often behaved in Indochina as if our nation's men and resources were bargaining chips in an international game of poker. We have too often behaved, in Indochina and elsewhere, as if the preservation of the status quo abroad were essential to our survival here at home. We have too often behaved, in Indochina and elsewhere, as if international politics were a simple contest between the forces of darkness and the forces of light.

How, then, should we behave in a world where distrust and hostility still run deep, where the aims of nations continue to differ in fundamental respects? While remaining prepared to resist the threat or use of force, we must also be prepared to exercise the wisdom, moderation, and restraint which are necessary if man is to create the conditions for peace.

We must remember that saving men's lives is more important than saving face for governments. We must remember that a foreign policy which cannot be presented honestly to the American people does not deserve their support. I speak tonight out of deep concern that we have forgotten these very principles in Indochina, and so the war goes on.

I am deeply concerned that after this Administration has assured us it was winding down the war, it has taken new military actions across the face of Indochina. I am deeply concerned that this Administration has ruled out any further initiatives by our negotiators at the Paris Talks. I am deeply concerned by the news blackout before the invasion of Laos, and the conflicting reports of what is happening there now. Eventually, we will know, and the Administration will learn that it can embargo the news, but it cannot embargo the truth.

It is cynical for this Administration to argue that Americans are not engaged in ground combat in Laos when American helicopter gun crews are involved in ground combat, and American lives are being lost. A difference of thirty feet in altitude between helicopter gunners and the ground troops they are firing at is no difference at all in function.

I believe it was wrong to unleash South Vietnamese troops across the border of Laos and support them there, as I believed it was wrong to lead them across the border of Cambodia. What we have attempted, with a limited number of South Vietnamese, is an operation that has been rejected in the past for far stronger U.S. forces. Once again, this Administration has minimized the risks and

exaggerated the benefits of a new military adventure. Whatever the apparent or illusory short-term military gains, this action has resulted in a substantial extension of our military involvement and has further undermined the Paris talks.

I believe it was right for the President to have told us last June that no combat support missions would be flown across the skies of Cambodia. I believe it was wrong for his Secretary of Defense, six months later, to characterize this pledge and the words of the Cooper-Church Amendment as matters of "semantics." If these matters are semantics, then neither the pledge nor even the laws of our government can have any reliable meaning.

I believe it is wrong to increase once again the bombing of North Vietnam. And I believe it was wrong for the President to refuse to rule out an invasion of North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese—who could not attack the North without our support.

The longer we lend our presence to this expanding conflict, the longer this conflict will endure. And the longer it endures, the more profound will be the injury done, not only to the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos, but to our own country—to our men who are killed or maimed and to their families, to our institutions of learning, to our procedures for governing, to our confidence in our society's ability to reach for its own ideals.

The President has had more than two long years to implement his so-called plan to end the war. But all that he has revealed is a program for maintaining a substantial American military presence in Indochina. Our troop level in South Vietnam will have been reduced to 284,000 men by May of this year. I welcome that reduction. I believe all Americans welcome that reduction. This Administration has tried to make us believe, however, that its policy is to train the South Vietnamese to take over the fighting so our troops can be withdrawn. But has the President said that this is his policy? No—he would only say last Wednesday that we will withdraw all our troops as part of a mutual withdrawal.

Then what are we to make of the President's refusal to say his policy will lead to a complete withdrawal of American troops? Must Americans fight and die indefinitely in Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos? Must our men in South Vietnam remain indefinitely as props for the Thieu-Ky regime? And how long must further thousands of our men in Thailand and on the seas off Indochina be committed to this war? These are the things we want this Administration to make perfectly clear.

This much we already know: Vietnamization is not the answer. Vietnamization is no answer for our American men still held captive as prisoners-of-war. Vietnamization is no sure answer for the safe withdrawal of our remaining troops. Vietnamization is no answer for a negotiated settlement to end all of the fighting. Vietnamization perpetuates the illusion of ultimate military victory.

This Administration now argues that its activities in Cambodia and Laos will protect Vietnamization and thereby hasten an end to the war. It is a curious logic that would conclude a war by widening it. What will happen if American troop levels continue to drop and our forces become more vulnerable to attack? Will there then be more invasions of Laos by the South Vietnamese, with continuing American support? Or will the President then resume the air war against North Vietnam beyond the vague limits of what is now called "protective reaction?"

Only last Wednesday, the President said he was "not going to place any limitation" on the use of conventional air power anywhere in Indochina, including North Vietnam. Let us remember that the bombing of North Vietnam accompanied a massive increase in American troops from 1965 to 1968. The bombing left hundreds of American pilots prisoner in North Vietnam. The bombing did nothing to prevent the TET offensive. And when we stopped the bombing in October 1968, our objective was to begin substantive negotiations.

The President now says he will take no new initiatives at the Paris talks. All that is left of the President's so-called plan is Vietnamization. Some say that plan will work. Some say it will not work. I say it is the wrong plan in either case.

If the plan does work, we can look forward to continued warfare among the Vietnamese and an indefinite American presence. If it

doesn't work, this Administration does not exclude the possibility of attacks on North Vietnam itself. The dangers are incalculable. A plan which leaves only these alternatives, which gives us only these bleak expectations, is the wrong plan. It is the continuation of a war which must come to an end.

I am convinced that for the right policy we must look—not toward Vietnamization, but rather toward the peace negotiations and toward creating the conditions for peace. We must seek to negotiate in Paris what is negotiable and what can never be settled on the widening battlefields of Indochina.

We cannot hope to dictate the lasting terms or even the shape of a political settlement of this conflict. Only the Vietnamese can settle their political differences. Only they can fashion a settlement in which they have a stake. Only they can understand the political realities which such a settlement must reflect.

It should be clear to all of us by now that this war is essentially a war fought among the Vietnamese people for political ends. And therein lies a lesson of this tragedy. We cannot substitute our will and our political system for theirs. We cannot write the social contract for another people. We may, however, be able to reach agreements on those issues which concern us most, provided we make clear our intention to withdraw all our troops from Vietnam by a fixed and definite date.

I have no doubt we could then negotiate the release of our American prisoners of war before that deadline. I have no doubt we could then negotiate the safe withdrawal of all our troops now stationed in South Vietnam. In addition, there could be a cease-fire between our troops and theirs which could be the first step toward a complete standstill cease-fire among all the parties. At the same time, we could work toward agreements to end the fighting in Cambodia and Laos. And we could encourage the Vietnamese parties to negotiate a political settlement that would restore a measure of peace to all of Vietnam. These must be the goals of our policy in Indochina.

Many Americans believe that events have taken over, that things have gotten out of hand, that nothing they can do will change the policy of this Administration. But I believe you can make a difference, even before 1972. You can exert responsible public pressure upon the Executive branch for an American commitment to complete withdrawal, before 1972. You can support initiatives in the Congress to establish an Indochina policy which makes sense, before 1972.

That is why I introduced a sense of the Senate Resolution last May, calling on the President to establish a timetable for the complete and orderly withdrawal of all American troops. That is why I co-sponsored the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment in the last Congress. And that is why I have agreed to co-sponsor it in this Congress, and to support its establishment of a deadline of December 31, 1971.

It should be clear to us by now that for too many years, we have pursued the wrong policy in the wrong place in the wrong way. The price of that policy has been a terrible cost in American lives and resources. The price has been a terrible cost in the suffering of the peoples of Indochina.

We have helped to destroy their countryside, their towns and their villages, the very fabric of their lives. And if we now have any commitment in Indochina, it must be this: we must help the people of this region rebuild their countries and heal the wounds of war. We must show in Indochina that we understand what foreign policy is all about, what wisdom and judgment and restraint are all about, what compassion and moral obligations are all about.

Isn't it clear then what we must do? After so many young Americans have felt compelled to demonstrate against their own government; after so many Americans of every description have come to doubt what their government says and to doubt that their government will listen; after so much division and disillusionment throughout this land; isn't it clear?

Of course, it is clear. It is clear that the only light at the end of the tunnel will be the one we strike ourselves. We must withdraw all our troops from Vietnam. We must do so by the end of this year. We must be willing—all of us—to say, "Enough."

against the professional hatemongers and poison-pen pamphleteers who will come into this election as they have in others.

It is not enough to dissociate oneself from scurrilous propaganda put out on one's behalf, but a candidate has the responsibility to take active measures against it.

The purpose of a political campaign is to make clear the parties' stands on major problems and to demonstrate the candidates' abilities to deal on critical questions. The American people can make an intelligent decision this year only if the issues are presented to them honestly.

If the American people succeed, it will be despite the efforts of some strong forces to deflect them. There will be organizations and publications—like the Ku Klux Klan, the falsely named committee for constitutional government, and a magazine called Human Events, to mention just three—that will peddle messages of suspicion and falsehood, that will attempt to rally prejudice in place of reason.

The hatemongers are already using every smear technique in the book to invoke hatred in an effort to win elections by hiding the issues. They deal in guilt by association, innuendoes, distortions, half-truths and wild fabrications. They use leaflets, crude and obscene cartoons, composite photographs, whispering campaigns, and a hundred other devices. Sometimes they peddle signed literature; more often, anonymous trash.

We cannot stop the circulation of all of this hate literature, but we can cut it down. We can also publicly disown it. And, more important, we can immunize ourselves against it—"to be forewarned is to be forearmed."

And, as the denial rarely ever catches up with the charge, we can do some denying in advance.

Before discussing methods we can use to inoculate ourselves against the hate injections, let me make clear that, although I am highly partisan—and shall do everything I can to help Senators KENNEDY and JOHNSON—I do not consider this problem of clean campaign tactics as even vaguely partisan. It is important for all Americans that, whichever slate of candidates we select, we select them for valid reasons.

Certainly there can be no doubt that the political conscience of America is non-partisan. The National Committee on Fair Campaign Practices is led by a courageous Republican, Charles P. Taft of Cincinnati, who has worked hard and effectively to secure the observance of fair campaign practices codes. My Democratic colleague from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], has labored long and hard in this field. A Republican and a Democrat, the senior Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY] and the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], made the presentations before the Internal Revenue Commission which led to a denial of tax exemptions for the political propaganda for Edward Rumely's committee for constitutional government.

I feel a particular responsibility for speaking out on this subject at this time because I recently witnessed a classical example of a campaign where appeals to false issues were rife.

I was the target of a number of these issues, such as "soft on communism." To support this charge, it was stated that I voted for the Kennedy bill to abolish student loyalty oaths. New charges were made when I pointed out that first, the bill did not abolish the loyalty oath for students getting Federal loans, but simply eliminated from it a fuzzy and unfair part about no disloyal acts; and second, the bill was agreed to in the Senate on June 15, 1960, without even a request for a rollcall and, virtually, without dissent.

As this loyalty oath bill is now being used against Senator KENNEDY to support the allegation that he is "soft on communism," I shall read the student oath as it now stands:

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America and will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all its enemies, foreign and domestic.

We cannot stop anybody from saying that all of us who voted for this oath are "soft on communism" but we can forewarn those who might hear the charge and do not know the facts.

Many of the doctors and druggists in Tennessee participated in a massive letterwriting campaign, charging me with being "socialistic" because of our drug investigations and my support of an adequate plan for medical care for the aged.

I was cursed for my support of the United Nations.

All in all, it was pretty rough. Yet, we did manage to keep the real issues before the people of Tennessee, and we did penetrate the fog so that they could see the role played by the special economic interests and by the professional hatemongers.

We were successful in Tennessee and I am hopeful that we will be successful in the Nation. Now with our national life challenged by attacks on both sides of the oceans, America faces a crucial test of its maturity. Can we choose a government rationally and intelligently? Or will we make our decision on the basis of blind, unreasoning passions and irrelevant "issues"?

We have faced this test before.

In 1860, Abraham Lincoln was subjected to the worst sort of vilification imaginable. Yet, he won. I believe his victory was partially due to the fact that he refused the support of hate groups.

In more recent times, in 1928, we went through an equally dirty campaign, and one in which the vilified candidate lost. There is certainly grave doubt that Al Smith would have won in 1928 even if there had been no scurrilous attack upon him because of his religion—it was probably not a Democratic year in any event. But this detracts not one whit from the fact that part of his defeat was directly due to a campaign calculated to stir up religious hatreds.

TO BE FOREWARNED

Mr. KEFAUVER. In every national election the claim is made that the Nation is at a crossroads. This claim is not altogether untrue, because, when examined carefully, each of our national elections has taken place in the shadow of one or more important issues.

It is not the purpose of my remarks today to enumerate the many important issues facing the American people when they go to the polls in November 1960.

Nor is it my purpose to dwell on the fact that the rest of the world—both Communist and free—always watches our elections with much interest. It will watch more carefully than usual this time, because the hope for freedom on every continent hangs on the survival of a strong American democracy. We can no longer afford the luxury of indifference to the people who watch us. Our lives may well depend on their reactions.

If we allow this present contest to descend to the low level of some past elections, we cannot help but lower ourselves in the eyes of those upon whose help and friendship we depend and also give aid and comfort to those who boast that they will "bury" us.

But, more important in my view is the harm which a hatemongering election will do to us as a nation.

Hate begets hate; passion begets passion. Not only will a smear campaign damage the image of our country, it will also damage the soul and the conscience of our Nation.

Therefore, I would like to join those who have raised their voices to warn

And this campaign was a blatant repudiation of both the spirit and letter of our Constitution that religion is not a test for political office. Article VI of that sacred document states specifically that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States."

When America faced the test in 1928, she flunked.

The question now is whether the ghost of 1928 has been laid to rest.

All indications are that it has not—that it is riding high, at least in some places.

The country is being flooded once again with false and libelous anti-Catholic materials. Some of it is obscene. Most of it is unsigned.

There is every likelihood that this hate campaign will get worse before it gets better. There is no telling what type of disgusting trash may be shoved under the doors or put in the mailboxes of millions of decent Americans.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am happy to yield to my distinguished colleague from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. Does not the Senator believe that, regrettable though this type of activity is, it may be better for the electorate that it has started so soon? Starting so soon, the American people will have ample opportunity to measure it and reject it.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes; I agree with my colleague that it is regrettable that there must be distortion and smear literature and misrepresentations. I commend the many outstanding statesmen and public servants, both Democrats and Republicans, for denouncing it. I thank my colleague. He is right that, with the smear campaign having started early, and with the American people analyzing and weighing it over a period of time, its effect will certainly be diminished and, in many cases, completely demolished.

However, there is every present indication that we can expect an increasing flow of different types of smear literature and unsigned political documents. I believe that immediately before the election we may anticipate new types. Therefore, I think it is well that the American people be forewarned as to what to expect and what might happen, so that they can be on the lookout for it.

As a matter of fact, in some cases, when there is time and when the explanation catches up with the charge, the charge backfires against the people upon whose behalf it is intended to be circulated.

I thank my colleague. As chairman of the subcommittee investigating elections several years ago, he has had a great deal of experience with this kind of thing.

We may see the scurrilous "Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk," which purports to be the autobiography of a nun, but which, in fact, was written by a demented woman of ill repute in 1832. The people of Wisconsin saw a revival of this fraud in the primary election of 1960.

Or we may see the false charge that Abraham Lincoln was assassinated by Catholics after he had voiced a warning against Catholicism. The people of Wisconsin did.

Or we may see the bogus document which pretends to be a secret oath of the Knights of Columbus, a Catholic fraternal and patriotic group. According to this fraudulent document, members of the organization pledge that, when ordered, they will commit against heretics almost every horrible crime imaginable, including murder, torture, and arson.

Unfortunately, this false oath was an issue in the West Virginia primary this year. It is still being widely circulated in the country.

I have a copy of this false document here, and I shall not ask that it be inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. This was done once before—in 1913—in an attempt by a congressional committee to demonstrate its absolutely false nature. Ever since then, hatemongers have cited its appearance in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as proof of its authenticity. The technique is typical of the hatemongers.

The Library of Congress prepared a short "Statement Concerning the Fraudulent Character of the Alleged Knights of Columbus Oath," and I desire that it be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT CONCERNING THE FRAUDULENT CHARACTER OF THE ALLEGED KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS OATH

The so-called oath of the Knights of Columbus formed the basis of one of the charges in the contested election of Eugene C. Bonniwell against Thomas S. Butler of the 7th Congressional District of Pennsylvania, in the 62d Congress, and was printed as an exhibit, not as being the oath of the order, in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, February 15, 1913 (p. 3216). The committee report on the case (H. Rept. 1523 of the House Committee on Elections No. 1, 62d Cong. was also printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of February 15, 1913 (pp. 3215-3221).

Mr. Bonniwell's fourth charge (p. 3216) referred to the circulation of "a blasphemous and infamous libel, a copy of which is hereto attached, pretended to be an oath of the Knights of Columbus, of which body the contestant is a member." He added: "So revolting are the terms of this document and so nauseating its pledges that the injury it did not merely to the contestant but also to the Knights of Columbus and to Catholics in general can hardly be measured in terms."

Mr. Butler, the contestee, said (p. 3219): "I believe the circulation of this paper known as the Knights of Columbus oath, notwithstanding my sincere efforts to suppress it, and spurious as I believed it to be, was of disadvantage to me and lost rather than gained votes for me."

The committee, while seating Mr. Butler, concluded: "This committee can not condemn too strongly the publication of the false and libelous article referred to in the paper of Mr. Bonniwell, and which was the spurious Knights of Columbus oath, a copy of which is appended to the paper."

The CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of January 29, 1915, contains (p. 2721) the findings submitted by Representative Kettner, of California, of a committee of Free Masons in California, who examined the ceremonials and pledges of the Order of Knights of Columbus. The committee said: "We find

that neither the alleged oath nor any oath or pledge bearing the remotest resemblance thereto in matter, manner, spirit, or purpose is used or forms a part of the ceremonies of any degree of the Knights of Columbus. The alleged oath is scurrilous, wicked and libelous, and must be the invention of an impious and venomous mind."

The CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of February 4, 1915 (p. 3017-3020) is connection with remarks by Representative Gallivan, of Massachusetts, contains a report, presented by him, of the commission on religious prejudice of the Knights of Columbus, in which there is a review of the various prosecutions for criminal libel "in printing or publishing or defaming by means of the alleged oath." The same number of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD (p. 3021) contains also the above-mentioned report of the committee of Free Masons.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, for those who might wonder what the true oath is, I shall read that actually taken by members of the Knights of Columbus:

I swear to support the Constitution of the United States. I pledge myself, as a Catholic citizen and a Knight of Columbus, fully to enlighten myself upon my duties as a citizen and conscientiously perform them entirely in the interest of my country, regardless of personal consequences. I pledge myself to do all in my power to preserve the integrity and purity of the ballot and to promote respect for law and order. I promise to practice my religion consistently and faithfully, and to so conduct myself in public affairs and in the exercise of public virtue as to reflect nothing but credit upon our holy church, to the end that she may flourish and our country prosper to the greater honor and glory of God.

During the present campaign we may also suddenly discover that a candidate chooses to run against a labor leader rather than against his opponent.

For example, in the 1958 electioneering, Walter Reuther, whose total commitments to democracy and whose integrity in the American labor movement have been used to good effect in our struggle overseas against communism by our own State Department, was not a candidate. Yet, in 35 States of the Union, candidates for office chose to run against him and straw issues rather than against their actual opponent and on the real issues.

Let me suggest that a proper regard for the rights of people who are not candidates in the election campaign be observed.

Vilification and character assassination of innocent bystanders certainly should not be tolerated. Candidates themselves, of course, must expect to bear up under the blasts of campaign heat. But even at the climax of the campaign battle, candidates, too, are entitled to criticism that stops on the decent side of the line that separates libel and accusations of treason from a fair charge, strongly made.

In the present campaign, both the Republican and Democratic National Committees, as well as both candidates, have pledged their best efforts to see that prejudice and intolerance are kept out of the campaign.

This is certainly highly commendable. But, if past experience is any guide, these declarations will be only partially suc-

cessful in spite of the statements of good intentions.

The American people themselves must be informed on the activities of hate peddlers.

They must be on the alert against plausible poisons.

They must be skeptical.

They must be inoculated against becoming infected with the germ of unreason.

They must become suspicious of all unsigned political literature, especially leaflets and pamphlets containing stories that are too pat or too inflammatory.

They must be able to recognize self-contradictions, such as accusations that a candidate is "ruled from Rome" and at the same time he is "soft on communism."

They should make no appeal and hear no appeal which cannot properly be made to every American.

They should be informed that there are both Federal and State laws against corrupt campaign practices and unsigned literature.

They should know that there is a national committee on fair campaign practices which is ready, willing, and able to help cut down on the evil effects of hate peddling.

They should demand that all candidates for political office agree to the committee's code of fair campaign practices, and I ask that this brief code be printed at this point in my remarks. And they should report violations of the code to the committee.

There being no objection, the code was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CODE OF FAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES

There are basic principles of decency, honesty, and fairplay which every candidate for public office in the United States has a moral obligation to observe and uphold, in order that, after vigorously contested but fairly conducted campaigns, our citizens may exercise their constitutional right to a free and untrammelled choice and the will of the people may be fully and clearly expressed on the issues before the country.

Therefore:

I shall conduct my campaign in the best American tradition, discussing the issues as I see them, presenting my record and policies with sincerity and frankness, and criticizing without fear or favor the record and policies of my opponent and his party which merit such criticism.

I shall defend and uphold the right of every qualified American voter to full and equal participation in the electoral process.

I shall condemn the use of personal vilification, character defamation, whispering campaigns, libel, slander, or scurrilous attacks on any candidate or his personal or family life.

I shall condemn the use of campaign material of any sort which misrepresents, distorts, or otherwise falsifies the facts regarding any candidate, as well as the use of malicious or unfounded accusations against any candidate which aim at creating or exploiting doubts, without justification, as to his loyalty and patriotism.

I shall condemn any appeal to prejudice based on race, creed, or national origin.

I shall condemn any dishonest or unethical practice which tends to corrupt or undermine our American system of free elections or which hampers or prevents the full and free expression of the will of the voters.

I shall immediately and publicly repudiate support deriving from any individual or group which resorts, on behalf of my candidacy or in opposition to that of my opponent, to the methods and tactics which I condemn.

I, the undersigned, candidate for election to public office in the United States of America, hereby endorse, subscribe to, and solemnly pledge myself to conduct my campaign in accordance with the above principles and practices, so help me God.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, we Members of the Senate, of both parties, have a responsibility in this regard. We are leaders in our communities. We have the duty to raise our voices against prejudice when it raises its head.

Provided the people get the facts, I am confident that their good sense and the national conscience will not tolerate the substitution of poison peddling and scandal mongering for a presentation of the reality which must be faced in the election booth.

No party has a monopoly on patriotism. Both parties have an identical commitment to the welfare of our country and our people. The differences which exist between parties are based on different American views of how this welfare might best be furthered.

We do differ, and properly, on vital issues whose resolution will decide how we meet our national destiny—foreign policy, a national growth policy, the farm calamity, monopoly controls, how to insure justice for every American, national education policy, resources policy, medical assistance for the aged. On these issues, the debate should be hot and articulate, and every fact that has a bearing should be put before the people.

This is the responsibility of the candidates and the parties, but the American people have a responsibility too: They must search their conscience and vote accordingly.

In conclusion, I should like to quote a few short paragraphs from a booklet entitled, "Prejudice and Politics," by Charles P. Taft and Bruce L. Felknor.

The citizen can learn that the average voter can, in fact, exert absolute control over politics in his community, and over the use of prejudice in politics.

For prejudice and politics have one thing in common: Each can work only so far as people are willing to accept it. Prejudice operates where people are willing to let it hold sway over their minds and beliefs and actions. Politics can operate only so far as people accept it as the means by which governments are constituted and conducted. The citizen who calls politics beneath his consideration is depriving himself of his only opportunity to share in governing himself and his neighbors.

In the final analysis, the voter who is fooled and the citizen who is misgoverned have only themselves to blame for their plight. And the realization of that fact is our brightest hope for the future of the United States of America.

I, for one, have great faith in the American voter. Let us give him a fighting chance by keeping the campaign on the tracks, by discouraging false charges, and by ruling out blind intolerances.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. BIBLE. I have followed with great interest the very fine talk which the distinguished Senator from Tennessee has just made. I commend him for it. I think he strikes the right tone. I had occasion to appear on a television program day before yesterday. I hope I spoke in the same vein, although I am certain I did not speak half so well. I think we ought to look with great alarm upon any campaign that moves in the direction against which the Senator from Tennessee has warned.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am certain the Senator from Nevada spoke more forcefully and eloquently than I have.

Mr. BIBLE. I commend the Senator. His remarks are in good taste and are properly spoken. Certainly the people of the United States should take great strength from reading such an able talk as the one he has just delivered.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I thank the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I, too, wish to commend the senior Senator from Tennessee for what he has just said. In his speech, he talked about the responsibilities of the people, using the term in its generic sense. He has exercised his responsibility as a U.S. Senator in a very statesmanlike and responsible way.

I hope that the remarks he made this afternoon will be read by all Americans, regardless of their political affiliation.

The Constitution of the United States makes no mention of race, religion, or region. I express the hope that when the people of the country go to the polls, they will judge the candidate of their choice on the basis of his record, his integrity, his ability, and his determination.

I compliment the Senator from Tennessee. Once again, as on so many public occasions, he has rendered a distinct public service. I commend him.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I deeply appreciate the compliment paid me by the distinguished Senator from Montana.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. KEATING. The distinguished Senator from Tennessee, in characteristic fashion, has made a forceful, vigorous plea for religious tolerance. Certainly we who know him and know his record are aware of the fact that the Senator from Tennessee has always stood for human tolerance and mutual understanding among peoples. The words which he has spoken cannot be too often stated. In the forthcoming presidential campaign—and in every election campaign—candidates should be judged on the record. The place where they attend church is a matter of their own choice. The place where they were born is irrelevant. Their economic status is irrelevant. The things that are relevant are their record, their qualifications, their character, and their ability to lead our great country.

All Americans can join in the hope expressed by the distinguished Senator from Tennessee that religion must in no way enter into the forthcoming campaign.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I thank the Senator from New York. I know his words represent the philosophy which he has demonstrated over many years. I thank him for his addition to this discussion this afternoon.